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We model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility. In a
common agency setting, domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the
incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters’ welfare
and contributions collected. We characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how
the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome. We establish a similar result
for quotas, allowing for partial rent capturing. For the strategic environment under consideration, we
also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory suggests that the free international movement of production factors is
efficient, but countries invariably use their sovereignty to restrict migration and influence
the flows of foreign direct investment. Notwithstanding Lady Liberty’s promise bGive me0022-1996/$ -
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has ever adopted an bOpen DoorQ policy towards international migration, regardless of
ethnicity or national origin. Movements of capital, and in particular the flow of Foreign
Direct Investment, have also been the object of government regulation. At times in the past
they were severely restricted, whereas more recently they have been actively subsidized.1
There is substantial evidence regarding the role of pressure groups in shaping the
attitude of governments towards factor mobility. Labor Unions have consistently played an
important role in determining US migration policy. The enactment of the first legislative
measure to systematically limit immigration from a specific country–the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882–was the result of the efforts of the newly founded Federation of
Organized Trade and Labor Unions. Similarly, the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
played an important role in the introduction of the Literacy Test provision in the 1917
Immigration Act, with the explicit intent to bscreen and reduce the inflow of unskilled
workers in the U.S labor forceQ (Briggs (1998), page 125). More recently, the AFL-CIO
supported measures to reduce illegal immigration, that culminated in the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act.
Complementarities among factors are important in understanding pressure group
behavior. For instance, during a recent debate spurred by Senator Hollings’ bill limiting
FDI by foreign state-owned corporations, the president of the Communications Workers of
America, Morton Bahr, was called to witness on the proposed takeover of Voicestream by
Deutsche Telekom. In his testimony, he stresses how bIn the telecommunication industry,
the presence of Deutsche Telekom in our market-place could yield some substantial
benefits to workers and consumers.Q2 Similarly, analyzing the recent surge in immigration
into the United States, Goldsborough (2000) notes that bImmigration policy today is
driven by businesses that need more workers—skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal [. . .]
During the annual debate on H1-B visas two years ago, Silicon Valley executives trooped
before Congress, warning of a Y2K computer disaster unless the number of H1-B visas
was increased.Q
At the same time, competition for foreign direct investment has become a global
phenomenon. Both advanced and developing countries offer large financial and fiscal
incentives to attract foreign corporations. Examples abound—consider the automobile
sector as a particularly revealing case in point. Recent estimates3 show that the incentives
offered to attract new plants have risen from the roughly $ 4,000 per job paid by Ohio to
secure a Honda plant in 1980 to the $ 168,000 per job paid by Alabama in 1993 to
convince Daimler-Benz to build a factory near Tuscaloosa. Other countries hardly lag
behind. Portugal, for instance, offered an even more substantial package to secure a large
investment by Ford and Volkswagen in 1992 and the list could go on. We can summarize
this evidence as follows: on the one hand, organized factors lobby governments for
protection; on the other, complementarities between factors matter in determining the
amount of protection that is granted in equilibrium.1 See Oman (2000).
2 The full statement is available at http://www.com-notes.house.gov/ccchear/hearings106.nsf.
3 See Oman (2000), page 80.
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the first theory that highlights the role of interest groups in the formation of policies
towards international factor movements.4 We model the strategic interaction between
organized factors competing for protection and the government as a common agency
problem in the spirit of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman
(1994). In the first stage of the game, lobbies offer the incumbent politician contribution
schedules that are contingent on the degree of protection granted to different factors. In the
second stage, the government trades off social welfare against contributions in choosing
the optimal policy.
The equilibrium protection level granted to a particular factor depends on the structure
of production and on the political characteristics of the economy, according to a modified
Ramsey rule. In particular, protection is higher for a lobbying than for a non-lobbying
factor, and is increasing in the domestic supply of the factor, while decreasing in the
proportion of the population involved in lobbying.5 Furthermore, the equilibrium
protection level is determined by the degree of complementarity between inputs. For
example, suppose that two complementary factors, A and B, both lobby for protection.
Admitting more imports of factor A increases the marginal product of factor B. Therefore,
factor B has an incentive to lobby against protection for factor A, to secure a higher wage
for itself. More generally, the lobbying of a factor has a detrimental effect on the degree of
protection granted to its complements. This argument is reversed in the case of lobbying
substitutes.
These results hold irrespective of whether the policy takes the form of a tax or a
quantitative restriction. When quotas are used, as for example in the context of
immigration, the associated rents are often not captured by the domestic government.
We extend our result to allow for any degree of rent capturing as well as for mixed policies
where taxes are applied to certain factors and quotas to others. Furthermore, if capturing is
complete, we establish a general equivalence result of tariffs and quotas for the strategic
environment under consideration.
What are the long run implications of our model? We address this question in the last
section of the paper. To that end we consider first the effects of technological progress both
in the Home country and in the rest of the world. We show that while the first leads to an
increase in protection accompanied by larger factor inflows, the latter leads to higher
protection, and a decline in domestic factor employment. We then look at the impact
offspring of past immigrants have in the determination of current policy towards factor
mobility. It turns out that past immigration will lead to an increase in current protection,
and to a reduction in factor inflows.4 In an interesting recent paper (Blanchard, 2004) develops a trade model in which policy towards FDI is also
endogenously determined, as the result of the actions of a welfare maximizing government. Focusing on export-
platform FDI she shows first that source countries have an incentive to unilaterally liberalize trade with the FDI
destination country. Interestingly, in a multi-country extension of the original model, she also shows that if
preferential tariff treatment is possible, small countries will find it welfare maximizing to subsidize foreign
investment in the exporting sector.
5 This mirrors the results obtained by Grossman and Helpman (1994) for trade in final goods and corresponds
in our model to the special case when the production function is additively separable.
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economy of protection in international trade,6 studies that analyze the politics of
distortions in international factor movements are rare, and a unified framework has yet to
emerge. In most recent contributions, the political economy of migration has been
modelled as a univariate median voter decision problem, rather than as the result of the
lobbying activity by organized groups. In a very elegant paper, Benhabib (1996) considers
for instance the capital and skill requirements that would be imposed on potential
immigrants by an income maximizing polity. In his model, the median voter chooses to
admit individuals supplying a set of factors (labor, human, and physical capital) that are
complementary to the endowments of the natives. The same political process has been
used also in the large literature analyzing the impact of immigration on the recipient
country’s welfare system.7
The recent phenomenon of competition for Foreign Direct Investment has so far
received limited attention in the political economy literature. In an interesting paper on
the subject, Haaparanta (1997) uses a menu auction approach to model inter-
governmental bidding wars to attract foreign multinationals. The government uses FDI
as a way of reducing unemployment. Intuitive results emerge concerning the
distortionary effects of inter-jurisdictional competition, but the model is partial
equilibrium in nature and the interaction between domestic capital and FDI is
completely ignored.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the factor
protection game, while Section 3 provides a characterization of the equilibrium protection
structure. In Section 4, we consider quantitative restrictions, and in Section 5 we discuss
the long run implications of the model. Section 6 concludes the paper.2. The factor protection game
This section presents our model and describes the factor protection game. Consider a
small open economy that faces exogenously given international prices. For simplicity, and
since the focus of the paper is on factor movements, let there be only one output good
produced from a set of inputs I={1,. . .,n}. Note that with only one output we are
abstracting from trade in final goods. Instead we focus on the in- and outflow of the n
factors.8
Our small country has a population of M domestic residents. Each of them owns only
one type of (internationally mobile) factor. Let Mi denote the number of domestic agents
inelastically supplying factor i. Clearly M ¼ PiaI Mi. We can now define ratios ai=Mi/M
6 For an overview of this literature, see the surveys by Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1997), and Gawande and
Krishna (2003). Facchini (2004) surveys the literature on political economy models of trade and factor mobility.
7 Among the many interesting papers in this literature, see Mazza and van Winden (1996), Razin et al. (2002),
Scholten and Thum (1996), and Razin and Sadka (1999).
8 It would be interesting to also include multiple final goods, thus allowing for the joint determination of
policies towards factor movements and trade. For reasons of tractability and because we want to emphasize the
complementarity of factors, this paper analyzes the one sector-many factors case.
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as a distribution rule for aggregate profits and tariff revenue later on. Denote by S i the
domestic supply of input i and by mi the quantity of factor i that is imported (exported if
negative). The total supply of factor i available domestically thus amounts to Li
S=iI+mi.
Output is produced from these inputs according to the production function Y=F(L1,. . .,Ln).
Assuming decreasing returns to scale,10 we can equivalently represent the production side
by means of the corresponding profit function p(w). Domestic factor demands Li
D can then
be derived from this profit function via Hotelling’s lemma.
As for prices, we choose aggregate output as the nume´raire and normalize its price to
one. Let W be the set of real domestic input price vectors. We bound W so that each
domestic price wi must lie between a minimum wi and a maximum w
–
i.
11 Furthermore, let
w=(w1,. . .,wj,. . .,wn) be the domestic price vector, while w*=(w1*,. . .,wj*,. . .,wn*) indicates
the vector of real factor prices prevailing on the world market.
Policy towards the inflow and outflow of production factors is modelled as the result of
lobbying as in Grossman and Helpman (1994).12 That is, the lobbying game takes the form
of a menu auction a` la Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The lobbying factors13 KpI
submit contribution schedules Bi(w) to the government. In other words, these factors
specify their monetary contributions contingent on the (entire) domestic factor price
vector. Note that depending on the institutional setting, such payments may involve illicit
bribes or take the form of legal campaign support. The government, the common agent, or
auctioneer in this framework, subsequently grants or denies protection by setting the
domestic factor price vector14 and collects the contributions from the lobbying factors.
Having described the strategy spaces of the actors, let us turn to their respective
payoffs, expressed in monetary terms. Each factor (lobbying or not), receives a gross
payment of
gi wð Þ ¼ wiS i þ ai

p wð Þ þ
X
kaI
wk  w4k
 
LDk  S k
 8iaI ð1Þ9 The assumption that each agent owns only one type of (mobile) factors is convenient because multiple factor
ownership would require modelling explicitly the link between the owners of multiple (mobile) factors and the
lobby/lobbies that represent them. One possible way of accommodating multiple factor ownership would be to
completely forego the introduction of agents. The a’s would then specify an abstract distribution rule across
factors.
10 Alternatively, think of constant returns with an additional fixed factor, land for example. Ownership of this
factor would be distributed according to a and agents would earn an additional wage instead of claiming the
residual profit.
11 Notice that although Bernheim and Whinston (1986) consider the case where players bid for a finite set of
objects, the analysis carries through also to the case in which the auctioneer can choose from a continuum of
actions. See Bernheim and Whinston (1986), footnote 6.
12 Our framework is of course closely related to theirs, with the generalization that our production function
(corresponding to their utility function) allows for substitution and complementarity and the simplification that
factor supplies (output supplies in their model) are fixed.
13 We follow the literature in assuming that the subset of lobbying factors is exogenously given. A theory of the
endogenous formation of pressure groups has been proposed by Mitra (1999).
14 Note that fixing the domestic factor price vector is equivalent to imposing a set of tariffs and subsidies.
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its share ai of profits and of the revenue from protection.
15 Each organized factor
seeks to maximize its net payoff ni(w)=gi(w)Bi(w), by choosing a contribution schedule
Bi(w).
In determining the degree of protection to be granted to each factor, the government
weighs the sum of domestic citizens’ welfare against the monetary contributions paid by
the lobbies. As is standard in this literature–Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide a
micro-foundation for this specification–the government’s objective takes the following
linear form:
S ¼ a
X
iaI
gi wð Þ þ
X
iaK
Bi wð Þ az0
This objective function implies that that the elected politicians value one dollar of
contributions in their campaign coffers more than one dollar left with the public.163. The equilibrium protection structure
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium protection structure resulting from
this game. Denote by Ki the set of lobbying factors minus the ith lobby, \{i}. We are
interested in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the factor protection game, defined as
follows:
Definition 1. The collection ({Bi
0(w)}iaK, w
0) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the factor protection game if Bi
0 is feasible for all i a K, w0 maximizes
a
P
iaI gi wð Þ þ
P
iaK B
0
i wð Þ, and, given {Bj0(w)}jaKi, no lobby i has an alternative
feasible strategy Bi(w) that would yield a higher (net) payoff.
In other words, the collection ({Bi
0(w)}ia, w
0) is an equilibrium if each group’s
schedule is optimal for its members, given the expected contributions of the other lobbies
and the policy maker’s anticipated choice.
To refine the set of possible equilibria, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1994)
and assume that the contributions schedules {B(w)}iaI are differentiable, at least
around the equilibrium price vector. This assumption guarantees that the contribution
schedules are locally truthful. In other words, around the equilibrium price vector (w0),
the effect of a marginal change in policy matches the marginal change in the lobbies’15 Note that we implicitly assume that the shares are the same for profits as well as for tariff revenue. If we were
to relax this assumption, the qualitative results would carry through as long as the correlation between the two
distribution rules is sufficiently high. Since we do not have an informed prior concerning this correlation, we
prefer to work with the convenient assumption of identical distribution rules.
16 To see this point, note that ni(w)=gi(w)-Bi(w) if i a K and ni(w)=gi(w) if i g K. The objective function of
the government can then be rewritten as S ¼ a PiaI ni wð Þ þ 1þ að Þ PiaK Bi wð Þ and every dollar contributed
by a lobby is worth 1+a dollars to the incumbent politician.
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the following
Proposition 1. In an interior equilibrium, the government chooses a domestic price vector
w that satisfies
w wT ¼ j2wp
 1
z ¼ j2Fz ð2Þ
where jw
2p denotes the Hessian of the profit function with derivatives taken only with
respect to factor prices,j2F is the Hessian of the underlying production function, and z a
n1 column vector whose jth element takes the form
zj ¼
Ij  aK
 
S j
aþ aK :
and Ij is an indicator that equals 1 if factor j lobbies and 0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A. 5
To gain further insight, expanding the jth component of Eq. (2) we have
wj  wjT ¼  1
aþ aK
X
iaI
Fji Ii  aKð ÞS i 8jaI : ð3Þ
Consider first the diagonal elements, i.e. that element in each sum for which j=i. Strict
concavity of the production function implies that Fii is negative. Therefore, leaving aside
the other terms in the sum for a moment, if the factor under consideration lobbies (Ii=1) we
see an import tariff (an export subsidy) because aV1. If, on the other hand, this particular
factor does not lobby, then it has to endure an import subsidy (an export tax). The tariff
(export subsidy)–or the absolute value of the import subsidy (export tax)–is increasing in
Fii and S i but decreasing in a and a. The direction of these effects is intuitive. The more
weight the government places on social welfare (parameter a), the lower the tariff. The
larger the share of the domestic population involved in lobbying activities (a), the lower
the tariff each lobby obtains because their efforts partially offset each other. The greater the
curvature of the production frontier (|Fii|), the higher the tariff according to a modified
Ramsey rule. And, finally, the greater the domestic supply of a factor, the higher the tariff
it can obtain.
Suppose the off-diagonal terms are indeed zero, i.e. B
2F
BwiBwj
¼ B2p
BwiBwj
¼ 0 8ipj. Then the
production function is additively separable. We briefly discuss this special case to explore
the connection between our result and what Grossman and Helpman (1994) obtain for
trade in final goods. Define the proportional tariff imposed on factor i as ti ¼ wiw

i
w
i
. Then,
for all iaI, these tariffs are implicitly given by
ti
1þ ti ¼
Ii  aK
aþ aK 
S i=mi
emi;wi17 For this reason, Grossman and Helpman (2002) call these contributions bcompensating.Q
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emi;wi ¼ 
Bmi
Bwi
 wi
mi
This is exactly analogous to the result obtained by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in their
paper where tariffs apply to trade in final goods.18
Departing from this special case, let us emphasize that we view a full matrix of
substitution (or rather complementary) effects as essential on the production side. If two
factors i and j are complements, then FijN0, whereas if another pair of factors i and k are
substitutes, then Fikb0.
19 How do these relationships affect the equilibrium protection
levels? A lobbying complement will have a detrimental effect on the protection level
granted to the other factor.20 Letting in more imports increases the marginal product of the
complement. The complement therefore has an incentive to lobby against protection for
the other factor to secure a higher marginal product and consequently real wage for itself.
A lobbying substitute, on the other hand, positively affects the other factor’s equilibrium
protection level because letting in more imports of either factor would not only decrease
the marginal product–and thereby the real wage–of the factor itself, but also that of its
substitute. The substitute therefore also has an incentive to lobby for protection on behalf
of its bpartner.Q In the extreme case of perfect substitutes we could combine both into a
single factor and the increased weight of this new single factor would lead to a higher tariff
as seen above. If the complement or substitute does not lobby then the effects are reversed.
The existence of a complement (substitute) makes demand for the factor in question less
(more) elastic. The government will therefore set a higher (lower) tariff than it would have
in the additively separable case.
Given the role of complementarities among factors in shaping policy, it seems natural to
ask whether our equilibrium is coalition proof. To address this question, we use the results
established by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for (globally) truthful contribution
schedules. As we have already stressed, the assumption that the contribution schedules
used by the agents are differentiable implies that they are locally truthful around the
equilibrium point. Globally truthful schedules exhibit this property everywhere, i.e. take
the form Bi
T(w,B)=max {0, gi(w)B} for some B determined endogenously in the model.
Since the gross pay-off functions are differentiable, truthful schedules are differentiable as
well—except potentially at the point where they become zero. Bernheim and Whinston
show that each bidder’s best reply correspondence contains a truthful schedule.
Furthermore, truthful equilibria are efficient and any efficient outcome can be supported
as a truthful Nash equilibrium. Finally, all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition proof.18 In their framework, the assumptions that lead to this result are the existence of sector specific factors and a
quasilinear, separable utility function.
19 There is an alternative definition of gross substitutes that is based on the factor demand functions. Note that
our definition does not suffer from the inconsistency usually associated with buncompensatedQ effects.
20 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and McCalman (2004), modelling the role of lobbying by the producers
of one intermediate input in the trade context, show that a similar effect obtains between the one input and output.
However, in such a framework, they cannot address the general effects we are discussing here.
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focal.Q
Let us now turn our attention to the contribution schedules. How much does a particular
lobby pay the government to obtain its preferred policy? To answer this question suppose
the factor iaK did not lobby or offered a zero contribution. Given the equilibrium
contribution schedules of the other lobbies, the government would then choose a price
vector
wia arg max
waW
a
X
iaI
gi wð Þ þ
X
iaKi
B0i wð Þ:
In equilibrium–with factor i lobbying–the government must attain at least this payoff
level. Since lobby i will not contribute more than necessary, it follows that
a
X
iaI
gi w
i þ X
iaKi
B0i w
i  ¼ a X
iaI
gi w
0
 þ X
iaK
B0i w
0
 
and hence
B0i w
0
  ¼ a X
iaI
gi w
i þ X
iaKi
B0i w
i  a X
iaI
gi w
0
  X
iaKi
B0i w
0
 
By optimality of wi Bi
0(w0) must be (weakly) positive. We can therefore conclude that all
lobbies pay non-negative contributions in equilibrium.21
If the government of the receiving country is not able to discriminate between different
types of labor and/or capital, it might decide to implement the same level of protection for
a group of factors. How will this restriction affect the equilibrium outcome?
Notice first that if we focus our analysis on equilibria in which players use globally
truthful contributions schedules, the factors subject to the common tariff will continue to
lobby separately. This is the case because even in this new game, in which the government
implements a lower-dimensional policy-vector, the equilibrium is coalition-proof, as
shown in Theorem 3 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
As for the determination of the equilibrium policy outcome, suppose next, for
simplicity, that only two factors jaC={ y, z} are subject to a common policy. Furthermore,
by appropriate choice of units, assume that the world factor prices wy* and wz* are equal.
Focusing on the case of a separable production function, and following the same argument
as in the Proof of Proposition 1,22 we can derive the equilibrium protection structure as
described in the following21 If we want to go beyond this simple result–contributions could not be negative, after all–we again need to
focus on globally truthful contribution schedules. One can then solve for the reservation utilities of all lobbies and
subsequently for their actual contribution schedules. See also Mitra (1999) for a characterization.
22 See the Appendix A.
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domestic price vector wC such that
wCj  w4j ¼ 
1
aþ aK Fjj Ij  aK
 
S j 8jaI /C: ð4Þ
wCc  w4c ¼ 
1
aþ aK
Iy  aK
 
S y
1=Fyy þ 1=Fzz 
1
aþ aK
Iz  aKð ÞS z
1=Fyy þ 1=Fzz : ð5Þ
Notice that the factors not subject to the restriction continue to receive the same amount
of protection as in Eq. (3). In other words wjwj*=wjCwj* for all jaI\C. More
interestingly, the common tariff (wc
Cwc*) for factors y and z turns out to be a weighted
average of the original tariffs:
wCc  w4c ¼
BLy=Bwy
BLy=Bwy þ BLz=Bwz wy  w
4
y
 
þ BLz=Bwz
BLy=Bwy þ BLz=Bwz wz  w
4
z
  ð6Þ
In other words, the more responsive is a factor demand to changes in the own price, the
more weight that factor receives in the setting of the common tariff, and the closer is the
common level of protection to the original one enjoyed by this factor.4. Quotas
So far we have measured protection as the difference between the world market and
domestic prices. For a factor such as capital this seems natural. Taxes on external capital
transactions have been used to manage financial flows.23 Central banks at times impose
extra deposit requirement on foreign loans. In addition, fiscal incentives to attract foreign
direct investment are a global phenomenon that has become more and more relevant over
the last decade.24 But tariffs constitute only one of the policy instruments available to
governments for controlling the international flow of production factors. Where the23 For a historical perspective on the use of capital controls, see Cooper (1999).
24 According to Oman (2000) bData on the direct financial and/or fiscal dcost-per-jobT of incentives received by
investors in the automobile industry reveal orders of magnitude [. . .] that often exceeds $ 100,000.Q Another
example of the effectiveness of low corporate income tax rates in attracting FDI is given by the recent Irish
experience (Barry et al., 1999).
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rare.25
While it is natural to assume that the revenues from tariffs are fully captured by the
domestic government, this seems less appropriate when it comes to quantitative
restrictions. Consequently, we allow for the possibility that only part of the quota rent
is captured, and the remainder goes to the incoming factor. This reflects the fact that while
it is common for immigrants to receive a lower wage than equally skilled natives, it is also
true that their compensation in the destination country is higher than in their country of
origin.26
Let us start by describing the quota game. Define /(w)ujwp: WYL. In other
words, / denotes the negative gradient of the profit function which, by Hotelling’s
Lemma, equals the factor demands. Furthermore, let L*uRange(/(W)). Then, under the
quota game, every organized lobby presents the government with a contribution schedule
B˜i(L), that is, a function of the vector of factor quantities L. The government, on the other
hand, chooses factor quantities (and thereby implicitly the quotas) and collects the
contributions from the lobbies. In terms of payoffs, every lobby receives
g˜ i Lð Þ ¼ /1i Lð ÞS i þ ai p /1 Lð Þ
 þ X
kaI
ck /1k Lð Þ  w4k
 
LDk  S k
  !
;
where ck denotes the percentage of rent captured by the government from a quota on
inflows of factor k. The government’s objective function is now given by
S˜ ¼ a
X
iaI
g˜ i Lð Þ þ
X
iaK
B˜i Lð Þ:
A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of this quota game is defined as follows:
Definition 2. The collection ({B˜i
0(L)}iaK, L
0) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the quota game if B˜ i
0 is feasible for all i a K, L0 maximizes
a
P
iaI g˜ i Lð Þ þ
P
iaL B˜
0
i Lð Þ:and, given {B˜j0(L)}jaKi, no lobby i has an alternative
feasible strategy B˜i(L) that would yield a higher (net) payoff.
As a preliminary step we establish the following result.
Lemma 1. Let WJ be a subset of W where Jo I components are fixed, and similarly
define LJpL and LJ*pL*. Then, for all J, the mapping /J:WJYLJ(=LJ*) is a bijection.25 It is worth pointing out, though, that many tax codes (the US is no exception) include special provisions for
foreign workers which amount to an implicit immigration tax. Furthermore, during earlier waves of mass
migration, the use of fiscal instruments to control inflows of foreign workers was rather common. The United
States, for example, introduced a head tax of 50 cents per migrant in 1882, that was progressively raised to $ 8 in
1917. Canada was even more proactive in using taxes and subsidies to control the composition of the immigrant
population. In 1870, it introduced a travel fund of C$ 30 per adult for Mennonites that agreed to build settlements,
while in 1885 an Immigration Act was passed by Parliament to brestrict and regulate Chinese immigrationQ by
assessing a tax of C$ 50 per head. This tax was raised to C$ 200 in 1910. For more details on past immigration
policies we refer the reader to the interesting work of Timmer and Williamson (1996).
26 Note that in this paper we do not endogenize the choice of the policy instrument to be used, or the degree of
rent capturing. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000) address this question in the trade context.
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Using Lemma 1 and taking into account partial rent capturing, we can derive the
following result.
Proposition 3. In an interior equilibrium under partial capturing the government chooses
a vector of quantitative restrictions q or equivalently the domestic employment vector
L=q+S that satisfies
C /1 Lð Þ  w4  ¼ j2wp 1z˜ ¼ j2Fz˜ ð7Þ
where C is a diagonal matrix with elements {c1, . . . , cn} and z˜ a (n1) column vector
whose jth element is
z˜j ¼ zj  1 cj
 
Lj  S j
 
To explore the effects of partial capturing on the tariff-equivalent of the quota,27 let us
expand the jth component of Eq. (7)
/1j Lð Þ  w4j ¼ 
1
cj
X
iaI
Fji
Ii  aKð ÞS i
aþ aK  1 cið Þ Li  S ið Þ
 
8jaI ð8Þ
First, consider the case of full capturing of the quota rent. The RHS of Eq. (8) then
coincides with the solution we found for price restrictions in Eq. (3). This establishes the
equivalence of price and quantity restrictions which is familiar from the competitive trade
context. Nevertheless, this result is remarkable here given that we are modelling the
strategic interaction among different groups. In fact we can show the following stronger
result:
Proposition 4. The tariff game is strategically equivalent to the quota game.
Proof. Define B˜i(L)=Bi(/
1(L)) for all iaK and apply Lemma 1. 5
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Lemma 1 guarantees that the
government can control the outcome in the factor market–i.e. the combination of factor
employment and prices–by either setting domestic prices or domestic employment. The
lobbies’ contributions depend only on the outcome, not on the policy variable used to
achieve it.28
Coming back to Eq. (8), let us now discuss the case in which rent capturing is partial.
We can see that the effect of reduced rent capturing works through two channels. On the
one hand, when rent capturing is partial, the decrease in revenues equally affects everyone.
However, the government prefers to see a disproportionate share of this cost being born by
the unorganized groups and wants to protect the organized sectors, hence tightening27 Notice that strictly speaking this expression is appropriate only under full capturing as we will show below.
28 Notice that a similar result can be obtained also for the original Grossman and Helpman (1994). See Facchini
et al. (2003).
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capturing, the effect of a change in protection on government revenue is completely offset
by an opposing effect on profits. When capturing is partial, this is no longer the case.
Whereas the effect on profit is the same as before, the implied change in revenues falls
short of offsetting the former. This renders protection less attractive.
Finally, note that Lemma 1 can accommodate also the case in which the government
chooses a mix of quotas for some factors and price restrictions for others. The resulting
policies–tariffs or tariff equivalents–are then determined by the right hand side of Eq. (8),
with cj=1 for every factor j that is subject to a tax.5. Long run effects
Even though our basic model is static in nature, it is interesting to analyze its long run
implications by means of a series of comparative static exercises. First, we focus on the
effects of technological progress that takes place in the home country as well as in the rest
of the world. We show that Hicks-neutral technological progress in the home country tends
to increase protection and factor employment, whereas–by a similar logic–an increase in
productivity abroad leads to a decline in domestic factor employment.
Subsequently, we consider the long run implications of factor mobility when the owners
of the mobile factor actually settle in the destination country and (a percentage of) their
offspring are naturalized. We find that the extent of protection granted to the domestic
factor (including the immigrants’ offspring) increases and that, depending on the fraction
of the offspring obtaining naturalization, this leads to a reduced inflow of immigrants, or
potentially to an outflow if the naturalization rate is very high. In carrying out these
analyses we focus on the separable case and point out the additional implications of
complementarity and substitutability whenever it is appropriate. Furthermore, for
simplicity, we concentrate on import competing factors that are actively lobbying.29
5.1. Technological change
Let us first consider technological progress in the home country that is of the Hicks-
neutral type.30 Formally, the production function now takes the form Y=A(t) F(L1, . . ., Ln),
where A(t) describes the level of technology that is available at time t. How does an
increase in A(t) affect the policy towards factor inflows as well as the very size of the
inflows themselves? Without loss of generality, let us assume that A(t=1)NA(t=0)=1.
Holding the employment vector fixed, this will lead to an increase in aggregate output by a
factor of A(1), as well as to an equi-proportionate increase in the marginal product of each
production factor.29 The extension of the analysis to include the three other possible cases is straightforward.
30 Of course, technological progress need not be Hicks-neutral. Indeed, recent evidence for industrialized
countries suggests that it is skill-biased. While explicitly introducing skill bias would affect the magnitude of our
findings, it would not change our results qualitatively.
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becomes
wjV w4j ¼ 
A tð Þ
aþ aK Fjj Ij  aK
 
S j 8jaI : ð9Þ
It follows that an increase in A leads to an increase in the endogenous domestic factor price
vector from w to w V. In particular, w Vw*=A(1) (ww*), which implies that the factor
price vector increases less than proportionally, i.e. w VVA(1) w.31 Recall that the marginal
product, on the other hand, increases proportionally with A when employment is held
constant. Hence, in order to restore the first order condition for profit maximization, the
marginal product will have to decrease, implying a higher equilibrium factor employment.
We can summarize this argument as follows:
Proposition 5. Under separability of the production function, Hicks-neutral technological
progress leads to an increase in protection and to higher employment for each of the
lobbying factors.
How will this result be affected if we allow for substitutability and complementarity
between production factors? Consider the case where factors i and j are complements. An
inflow of factor j then tends to increase, ceteris paribus, the marginal product of factor i.
This effect works against the required decrease in marginal product. Consequently, the
inflow of factor i necessary to restore optimality will need to be larger. If factor i and j are
substitutes instead, the effects are reversed and the additional inflows will be smaller.
So far we have considered technological change in the home country. Alternatively, we
could analyze the effects of an increased productivity in the rest of the world. First note
that technological change abroad will be reflected in the vector of world factor prices, w*.
In particular, technological progress in the rest of the world translates into higher world
factor prices and, as can be seen from Eq. (3), this price change is transmitted one-to-one
to domestic factor prices. In order to restore the first order conditions for profit
maximization, the marginal product of each factor has to increase, which requires a decline
in factor employment. In other words, technical progress in the rest of the world is the
mirror image of technological change at home.
5.2. Lasting effects of immigration
In the case of labor services, the inflow of the production factor is often accompanied
by the physical relocation of the owners to the destination country.32 In the basic version
of our model, the welfare of immigrants is not included in the objective function of the
government, nor are immigrants allowed to lobby. While this assumption is realistic in the
short run, over longer time horizons immigrants (and their offspring) might be naturalized31 Notice that we are implicitly assuming that the third derivatives of the production function are well-behaved
so that the direct effects dominate.
32 This could also be the case for other factor inflows—many traditional immigration countries, for example,
allow the immigration of entrepreneurs provided that they invest enough capital in the country.
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affect the equilibrium policy?
To keep the dynamic model simple and tractable, let us assume that all agents live for
only one period. At the end of each period, domestic and foreign-born residents alike have
exactly one child. Furthermore, assume that a share l of the immigrants’ offspring are
naturalized, i.e. they become citizens of the country to which their parents had migrated,
and behave exactly like their domestic counterparts. Formally, this implies that
S j(t)=S j(t1)+lmj(t1), for any period t. Assuming also that the government optimizes
period by period and cares only about the current generation, the equilibrium protection
policy can be described as follows
wj tð Þ  w4j ¼ 
1
aþ aK Fjj Ij  aK
 
S j t  1ð Þ þ lmj t  1ð Þ
  8jaI : ð10Þ
According to Eq. (10), the increased domestic factor supply will lead to an increase in
the absolute value of protection. To restore the first order condition for profit
maximization, the increase in the domestic price requires a corresponding increase in
the marginal product of the factor, and hence total employment must decline in
comparison to the previous period. Depending on the value of l, this will lead to a
reduced inflow of immigrants, or in the extreme to an outflow if the share of naturalized
immigrants is close to one. The reason for this result is that, while allowing immigrants or
their offspring to become citizens increases the demand for protection, it simultaneously
reduces the need for additional inflows.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed two questions: Why do we observe so much
government intervention in cross-border factor markets? What are its determinants? To
provide an answer, we have developed a political economy model of international factor
mobility, in which policy is endogenously determined by the interaction of an electorally
driven government and domestic pressure groups. In a menu auction a` la Bernheim and
Whinston (1986), organized factors present the government with contribution schedules
that specify payments which depend on the degree of protection to be granted by the
government. The government then trades off social welfare against contributions, choosing
the protection levels–either in terms of prices or quantities–for all the different factors.
Since we allow for multiple factors, our model is of considerable generality. Both
immigration as well as FDI policy can be explored within our framework. Solving for the
equilibrium protection levels reveals how tariffs or quotas that apply to the inflow of
foreign factors are determined: they depend, in an important way, on the production
structure, the domestic supply of the different factors, and a set of political characteristics
of the destination country.
The model can be taken to the data, and a preliminary attempt has been undertaken in
Facchini and Willmann (2004). In that paper, we estimate the model using a cross section of
20 OECD countries and taking advantage of the variability in policies implemented at the
national level. The preliminary results we obtain are encouraging and broadly support the
G. Facchini, G. Willmann / Journal of International Economics 67 (2005) 201–219216model developed in this paper. In particular, our findings highlight both the role of lobbying
as well as the importance of complementarities between factors in shaping policy.
As for further theoretical work, we can think of at least three directions in which the
model can be extended. One interesting avenue for future research is to include multiple
final goods and to consider explicitly the interaction between policy towards factor
mobility and trade restrictions in a setup in which lobbying activities play a role on both
dimensions. The question that could be addressed in such a framework is to what extent
the two sets of instruments are political substitutes/complements. Our framework could
also be generalized by considering multiple countries in order to model the domestic
determinants of inter-jurisdictional competition for production factors. This seems to be an
important issue, given the experiences of many countries that have been engaged in
bidding wars to attract foreign direct investment. Finally, the multi-factor setup we have
developed in this paper could be used to analyze the spillovers induced by different
policies when two or more countries consider liberalizing factor movements within a
common market, while retaining protection towards vis-a`-vis non-member countries. This
is the subject of discussions in the European Union, where members retain ample
discretionary power when it comes to exterior migration and FDI policies.33Acknowledgement
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A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Concentrating on differentiable schedules, condition (ii) of Lemma 2 from
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) translates into
a
X
kaI
jgk w
0
 þ X
kaK
jB0k w
0
  ¼ 0; ð11Þ33 For a first attempt at this task, see Facchini and Testa (2004).
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a
X
kaI
jgk w
0
 þ X
kaK
jB0k w
0
 þjgi w0 jB0i w0  ¼ 0 8iaK ð12Þ
Combining Eqs. (11) and (12) and we have
jgi w
0
  B0i w0  8iaK ð13Þ
which shows that the contribution schedules chosen by the lobbies are locally truthful, i.e.
the contribution a lobby is willing to pay for a marginal change in the domestic price
vector is equal to the marginal change in its gross welfare in a neighborhood of the
equilibrium price vector. Summing Eq. (13) over iaK and substituting into Eq. (11) gives
a
X
iaI
jgi w
0
 þ X
iaK
jgi w
0
  ¼ 0 ð14Þ
Taking a closer look at the gradient of the factors’ gross payoff function, we note–cf. Eq.
(1)–that
Bgi wð Þ
Bwj
¼ dijS j þ ai  S j þ
X
kaI
wk  w4k
  BLDk
Bwj
 !
8i; jaI ;
where the indicator
dij ¼

1 if i ¼ j
0 otherwise:
Using this derivative we can rewrite the rows of the two sums from Eq. (14) as
X
iaK
Bgi w
0ð Þ
Bwj
¼ IjS j þ aK  S j þ
X
iaI
wi  w4i
  BLDi
Bwj
 !
8j ð15Þ
X
iaI
Bgi w
0ð Þ
Bwj
¼
X
iaI
wi  w4i
  BLDi
Bwj
8j ð16Þ
where
aK ¼
X
iaK
ai and Ij ¼ 1 if factor j is lobbies;0 otherwise:

Substituting Eqs. (15) and (16) into Eq. (14) results in a system of equations that we solve
for the column vector of equilibrium protection, thus establishing the result. 5
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Proof. Consider the two price vectors wJ, w˜JaW and, without loss of generality, assume
that the two vectors share the same first j components, i.e.
wJ ¼
w41
: : :
w4j
wjþ1
: : :
wn
0
BBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCA
w˜J ¼
w41
: : :
w4j
w˜jþ1
: : :
w˜n
0
BBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCA
where wj+kpw˜j+k 80bkVnj. Suppose now that /J(wJ)=/J(w˜J). This implies that
wJ  w˜Jð Þ /J wJð Þ  /J w˜Jð Þð Þ ¼ 0:
But this contradicts the fact that /J is monotonic by virtue of p being strictly
convex.34 5
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